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Timothy J. Pierson, Xiaohui Liang, Ronald Peterson, David Kotz
Dartmouth College Computer Science Technical Report TR2016-789
Abstract—Nearly every setting is increasingly populated with
wireless and mobile devices – whether appliances in a home,
medical devices in a health clinic, sensors in an industrial setting,
or devices in an office or school. There are three fundamental
operations when bringing a new device into any of these settings:
(1) to configure the device to join the wireless local-area network,
(2) to partner the device with other nearby devices so they can
work together, and (3) to configure the device so it connects to
the relevant individual or organizational account in the cloud.
The challenge is to accomplish all three goals simply, securely,
and consistent with user intent. We present a novel approach we
call Wanda – a ‘magic wand’ that accomplishes all three of the
above goals – and evaluate a prototype implementation.
This Tech Report contains supplemental information to our
INFOCOM 2016 paper titled, “Wanda: securely introducing
mobile devices” [1]. Much of the additional information is in
Section II, III, and VI.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lately we have seen predictions of how the Internet of Things
(IoT) is poised to make billions of everyday objects “smart” by
adding wireless communication capabilities. The dream is that
networks of these newly connection-enabled devices will give
us greater insight into the behavior of complex systems than
previously possible. The reality, however, is that configuring
and managing billions of devices will be extremely difficult.
As they are normally envisioned today, IoT sensors are
low powered devices that have one or more sensors with
the ability to monitor an aspect of their local environment
such as temperature, have limited computational capabilities,
and to save power, have short range radios such as Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, or Zigbee. The concept is that these devices will be
physically placed in areas of interest, will monitor aspects of
the environment using their sensors, then will use their radio
to communicate their measurements to one or more distant
data repositories for aggregation and analysis.
As an illustration in the healthcare domain, imagine that
a general-practice physician tells a patient that he’d like the
patient to take home a wireless blood-pressure monitor and
use it every day so that the physician can remotely monitor
the patient’s health. The intention is that the blood-pressure
measurements taken by the patient will end up stored in the
patient’s Electronic Health Record (EHR) at the physician’s
clinic. The physician can then see the patient’s blood pressure
on a daily basis and get automated alarms if any abnormal
readings are recorded.
At least three problems arise in making scenarios such as
at-home blood-pressure monitoring a reality. The first problem
is that blood-pressure monitors, like many IoT sensors, do not
normally come with long-range communication connections;
they have short-range radios such as Wi-Fi [2], Bluetooth [3],
or Zigbee [4]. The blood-pressure monitor must somehow
get connected with other devices in the home such as a Wi-
Fi access point (AP) in order to transmit its medical data
to the physician’s EHR system. Making those connections
is difficult for many people [5] , especially considering that
different types of devices from different manufacturers often
have different methods of making a connection and that the
devices themselves often have very limited user interfaces.
A second problem with this blood-pressure scenario is
that once a connection is made between the blood-pressure
monitor and a device capable of transmitting data long
distances, the blood-pressure readings must get to the right
patient record in the right physician’s EHR system. This
implies that the blood-pressure readings must be augmented
with additional credentials (e.g., patient ID, password) and
destination information (e.g., a Restful API URL).
A third problem arises when devices partner with other
nearby devices so they can work together in a peer-to-peer
fashion, such as a blood-glucose monitor working with an
insulin pump. In these peer-to-peer cases the devices may
maintain a connection with a long-range communication device,
but may also need a connection with neighboring devices using
encryption based on a unique key for a specific pair of devices,
rather than a common key shared by all devices. Establishing
the encryption can be difficult if the devices have never met
before and have never shared a secret key.
To overcome these three and other difficulties inherent
in configuring wireless devices, we present a system called
Wanda. Wanda introduces a small hardware device called the
‘Wand’ that has two antennas separated by one-half wavelength
and uses radio strength as a communication channel to simply,
securely, and consistent with user intent, impart information
onto devices. In this paper we focus on connecting devices,
but the Wand could be used to impart any type of information
onto a nearby device. Wanda is more than just a solution for
pairing devices or connecting to access points.
Wanda builds on pioneering work done by Cai et al. in
Good Neighbor [6] in that the Wand determines when it is in
close proximity to another transmitting device by measuring
the difference in received signal strength on the Wand’s
two antennas. Wanda then expands upon Good Neighbor
by exploiting wireless signal reciprocity to securely impart
information in-band from the Wand onto the nearby target
device.
Unlike many other approaches, Wanda does not require any
specialized hardware (or any hardware changes) in the new
devices, does not require any pre-shared secrets, and does
not require complex algorithms or complicated cryptography
libraries. Furthermore, Wanda does not require the devices to
be adjacent, or even movable – useful for large appliances as
well as small mobile devices.
Using Wanda could hardly be easier: a person simply points
the Wand at a nearby device that requires connectivity and the
Wand almost magically imparts connectivity parameters onto
the target device. This happens one time and afterward the
Wand is not involved in future communications – the Wand
itself disappears from the picture.
A. Assumptions
Throughout this paper we make the following assumptions
about the “target device”, which is the device receiving
information from the Wand: (1) it has at least one radio antenna
that it can use to transmit and receive wireless data, (2) it can
measure the signal strength of wireless communication packets,
(3) it may be limited computationally, but can run a small piece
of software that implements the Wanda protocol, (4) it cannot
be relied upon to have additional sensors such as cameras,
microphones or accelerometers, and (5) it cannot be altered to
add new hardware.
We make the following assumptions about the Wand: (1) it
can be trusted to generate a secret key, (2) it has a radio
compatible with that of the target devices, and two antennas
located approximately one half wavelength apart, (3) it is easily
portable and can be brought next to and pointed at the target
device, and (4) it can run the Wanda protocol.
B. Contributions
Wanda is a novel approach for imparting information onto
a target device, even though the target device has never been
seen before, nor have any secrets been pre-shared. We make
four contributions in this paper:
1) a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to impart any
kind of information onto commodity wireless devices,
regardless of device type or manufacturer, without
hardware modifications to the device;
2) protocols for imparting information onto new devices
(such as a Wi-Fi SSID and password), introducing two
devices so they can establish a secure and user-intended
connection, and imparting cloud identity and credentials
into a new device;
3) a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation;
and
4) a security analysis of the system.
II. RADIO SIGNAL STRENGTH PRIMER
Wanda uses radio signal strength to impart information onto
devices; in this section we briefly review some basic concepts
that are key to Wanda’s operation. We start by reviewing the
theory behind how a signal travels through free space, then
examine how obstacles can affect the received signal strength,
and finally investigate variation in real-world signal strength
by capturing packets in three different environments. Wanda
leverages signal-propagation characteristics described in this
section to impart information on target devices and exploits
real-world environmental factors to make it virtually impossible
for adversaries to eavesdrop on Wanda communications. The
material in this section provides the theoretical foundations for
why Wanda should work, while Section VI shows that Wanda
does work.
A. Free space
A radio signal transmitted by an antenna attenuates, or fades,
as it travels through the air according to the well known free-
space propagation model [7] given in Equation (1):
Pr = PsGsGr
(
λ
4pid
)2
(1)
where Pr is the power received in watts, Ps is the power at
the surface of the sending antenna in watts, Gs and Gr are the
gains of the sending and receiving antennas, λ is the frequency
of the signal, and d is the distance between the sending and
receiving antennas.
This model assumes the radio waves travel through free
space without bouncing off or passing through any obstacles
before arriving at a receiving antenna. Although reflections and
multipath signals where the waves bounce off objects can affect
the signal strength measured at a receiver (discussed in more
detail below), in general the distance factor d in the denominator
of Equation (1) tells us that as the distance between the
transmitter and receiver increases, the signal strength at the
receiver decreases.
It is sometimes useful to consider signal strength in relation
to a known amount of power. In that case, dBm (which
expresses power in decibels compared to one milliwatt (mW))
is often used. The conversion is given by Equation (2):
dBm = 10 log10
(
Pr
1 mW
)
(2)
Using Equation (2) we can rewrite Equation (1) in dBm for
free space [7]. This gives us:
Pr = P0 − 10α log10
(
d
d0
)
(3)
where Pr is now the received power in dBm, P0 is the power
in dBm received at a distance of d0 from the transmitter, d is
the distance between the sending and receiving antennas, and
α, called the path-loss exponent, represents the reduction in
power as the signal travels. In free space α is 2.
In the remainder of this report we use Px to indicate power
in dBm predicted by radio signal propagation models, and
we use Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) to indicate
power measured in dBm by actual hardware.
B. Obstacles
Equation (3) gives a good approximation of signal attenuation
in free space, but in the real world obstacles, moving and
fixed, can attenuate a signal or cause reflections that create
multiple paths between a transmitter and a receiver. The result
is that multiple copies of the transmitted signal, each with
a different attenuation, delay, and phase shift, arrive at the
receiver superimposed upon each other. This superposition can
result in either constructive interference where multiple copies
of the signal add to each other, or destructive interference
where multiple copies of the signal cancel each other. The
changes in signal strength caused by obstacles is often called
fading.
There are two types of fading: slow and fast. Slow fading
occurs when changes to the signal strength happen slowly
over time. Shadowing, where an obstacle such as a building
lies between the transmitter and receiver, is an example of
slow fading. In this case the alteration to the signal strength is
normally constant unless the transmitter or receiver move. Fast
fading occurs when changes to the signal strength happen
quickly such as when a moving obstacle comes near a
transmitter and receiver.
We can account for fading by altering Equation (3) to add
a noise component which, gives us the log-normal shadow
model [7]:
Pr = P0 − 10α log
(
d
d0
)
+ χσ (4)
where χσ is a Gaussian random variable representing noise
with zero mean and standard deviation σ (in the case of slow
fading) or follows a Rayleigh or Rician distribution (in fast
fading environments). As noted above, in free space α is 2,
but it in real-world dynamic environments α often ranges from
1.2 to about 8 [8].
In a dynamic environment where there are moving objects,
the χσ representing noise in Equation (4) can change rapidly,
making actual measurements of RSSI highly variable. In a
dynamic environment the moving objects are changing their
position relative to the transmitter – which slightly changes the
length of the path taken by the portion of the signal reflecting
off from those obstacles. The difference in path length, in turn,
slightly alters the phase of the received signal. This change in
phase can change how the multiple copies of the signal add
up to create constructive or destructive interference. Finally,
the Doppler effect of the moving obstacle slightly changes the
frequency of the received signal, and interference has been
shown to vary greatly depending on the frequency of the
signal [9].
In addition to the environmental variables, the signal strength
captured by real equipment is also subject to manufacturing
variability as well as thermal noise in the antenna [10]. Wanda
exploits the variability from manufacturing and thermal noise,
together with variability from obstacles in the environment, to
make it difficult for an adversary to eavesdrop on communica-
tions between Wanda devices (see Section VII).
Location Mean Std Dev Range
Home -60 0.69 8
Coffee shop -84 1.50 10
CS lab -61 3.48 19
TABLE I
RSSI mean, standard deviation, and range (number of distinct values) of
12,000 Wi-Fi packets captured at three different locations. The standard
deviation and range of RSSI measurements increased as the number of
moving obstacles increased, but even the static home environment still
exhibited eight different RSSI readings.
C. Real-world observations
To understand the role environment plays in signal prop-
agation, we captured the signal strength of Wi-Fi packets
exchanged between a computer and a Wi-Fi AP in three very
different (but realistic) locations where Wanda might be used.
The first was a quiet home environment where no one was
moving, the second was a local coffee shop where a small
number of customers were milling about, and the third was a
busy computer science lab bustling with student activity. We
used an Alfa Networks AWUS036H external Wi-Fi antenna [11]
and captured the RSSI returned by the Alfa card in the form of
RadioTap [12] headers. These RSSI values were captured using
a Python program written with Scapy [13]. In all cases the
receiving antenna was stationary while packets were exchanged
with the AP.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of RSSI measurements
returned by capturing 12,000 Wi-Fi packets sent between a Wi-
Fi AP and the receiving antenna at each location. In the home
and computer science lab, the distance between the access point
and the receiver was approximately 4 meters. In the coffee
shop the distance was approximately 8 meters. The differences
in distance led to differences in RSSI, and as expected the
presence (or absence) of moving obstacles lead to a varying
degrees of variability of the RSSI. When packets were captured
in the quiet home environment the RSSI readings were tightly
grouped and had little variation; we saw increased variability in
the coffee shop, and a great deal of variability in the busy lab.
Table I provides details on the mean, standard deviation, and
range (number of distinct RSSI values) of the packet RSSIs
captured.
Although the variability in RSSI is lower in environments
where there is little activity, it is important to note that there
is still variability – it is not the case that RSSI readings
were the same for all packets. We saw that even in the quiet
home environment that there were still eight different RSSI
values observed. Other researchers have found that even in
an underground concrete tunnel where outside signals and the
effects of moving obstacles were not present, there was still a
variation of at least 2 dBm away from the mean [10].
As we see in the next section, Wanda uses the equations
in this section as the theoretical basis for its operation. It
uses them to create two primitive operations from which it
then builds more complex protocols. By using two antennas
Fig. 1. Distribution of 12,000 RSSI readings captured in three different
environments. The figures show a histogram of RSSI values measured, and a
best-fit Gaussian distribution for the RSSI values. Environments with more
moving obstacles had higher variability in RSSI values.
A1#A2#
Wand%
7"cm"
d1#
d2#
Target%device%
Handle"
Fig. 2. Wand with two antennas, A1 and A2, separated by 7 cm in our
prototype. The distance between antenna A1 and the target device is d1. The
distance between antenna A2 and the target device is d2. The Wand is intended
to be pointed directly at the target device, so that d2 = d1 + 7 cm.
Wanda is able to overcome the unpredictable environmental
noise and impart secret information onto a nearby device while
making eavesdropping virtually impossible from more than a
few centimeters away.
III. APPROACH
Wanda builds on two insights that can be gleaned from the
concepts highlighted in Section II. The first insight is that if a
device has two antennas, it can determine when it is in close
proximity to another device that is transmitting radio signals.
The second insight, our major technical contribution, is that
when a device with two antennas determines it is in close
proximity to another device, it can use its two antennas to
securely impart information onto the other device.
In Wanda, the Wand is the device with two antennas (see
Figure 2) and it uses those antennas to implement two primitive
operations: detect and impart. This section explains these
primitives in detail.
A. Detect primitive
When a new device is introduced to an environment, one of
the chief difficulties is determining whether radio signals are
actually coming from the new device or are really coming from
an attacker masquerading as a legitimate device. We assume
that devices physically available to a person are legitimate
devices (e.g., the devices a person owns are not compromised)
but that other more distant device may be attackers. We’d like
to know with a high degree of certainty if radio signals are
emanating from the device at hand, and not a distant attacker.
As shown in Section II, however, the RSSI received by a device
can vary significantly which makes it a poor estimator of range.
Wanda can determine when a device is in close proximity by
using two antennas.
Each antenna in the Wand is capable of independently
measuring the power received and providing a Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI). Building on Equation (4), the power
received on the two antennas of the Wand will be:
P1 = P0 − 10α log10(
d1
d0
) + χσ
P2 = P0 − 10α log10(
d2
d0
) + χσ
(5)
where P0 is the power in dBm measured at a distance of
d0 from the transmitter, Pi is the power in dBm measured
at receiving antenna Ai, and di is the distance between the
transmitter and receiving antenna i.
Armed with the equations in (5), we can now calculate the
difference in signal strength between the two antennas A1 and
A2 as follows:
P1 − P2 = P0 − 10α log10(
d1
d0
) + χσ
− (P0 − 10α log10(
d2
d0
) + χσ)
= −10α( log10(
d1
d0
)− log10(
d2
d0
))
= −10α log10(
d1
d2
)
(6)
The antennas on the Wand are physically close together; in
our prototype they are 7 cm apart (roughly 1/2 wavelength).
Because they are close together, the environmental factors rep-
resented by χσ in Equation (6) are likely to be similar on each
antenna. By taking the difference in signal strength observed
on two antennas, sometimes called the RSSI Ratio [14], the
environmental factors tend to cancel out. This suggests that
some of the randomness of the environment we saw in our
real world observations in Section II will be minimized in the
RSSI Ratio on the Wand.
When the Wand and the target device are far apart, the
distance between antennas A1 and A2 is small relative to the
distance to the far transmitter. In that case the RSSI will be
approximately, although not precisely, equal on each receiving
antenna. For example, suppose antennas A1 and A2 on the
Wand are 7 cm apart and are aligned with the transmitting
antenna so that A2 is 7 cm farther away from the transmitting
antenna than A1 (see Figure 2). In this case d2 = d1 + 7 cm.
Further suppose the distance between A1 and the transmitting
antenna, d1 is 30 cm (i.e., more than 4 times the distance
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Fig. 3. Expected difference in RSSI with d1 ranging from 1 to 50 cm. The
difference in RSSI readings increases rapidly as distance decreases.
between the two antennas). In that case, using Equation (6)
and assuming α = 2 yields a difference, ∆, of:
d1 = 30 cm
d2 = 30 cm + 7 cm = 37 cm
∆ = −10α log10(30/37) ≈ 1.8 dBm.
(7)
When the Wand is close to the target device, the distance
distance between antennas A1 and A2 is large relative to the
distance to the transmitter. In that case the difference between
received power on the two antennas on the Wand will be large.
For example, assume the transmitter in Figure 2 is located
1 cm from A1. In that case the expected RSSI difference is:
d1 = 1 cm
d2 = 1 cm + 7 cm = 8 cm
∆ = −10α log(1/8) ≈ 18.1 dBm.
(8)
This demonstrates that when the Wand is in close proximity
to a transmitting device, the difference in power readings
between the Wand’s two antennas will be significantly larger
than the difference in power readings when the device is far
away. In this example there is an expected 10-fold increase
in the RSSI Ratio when the Wand moves from 30 cm to
1 cm between the transmitter and A1. Figure 3 shows how the
expected power changes as the distance between the device
and transmitter changes.
Wanda determines whether the Wand and device are in close
proximity by examining the average RSSI Ratio according to
the following procedure:
δ¯ =
1
ω
ω∑
i=1
r1(i)− r2(i) (9)
close =
{
True if δ¯ ≥ τ
False if δ¯ < τ
where i is the ith packet transmitted and r1(i) is the RSSI for
packet i measured on antenna A1, r2(i) is the RSSI for the same
packet measured on antenna A2, τ is a fixed-value threshold to
determine if the devices are close, and ω is a window containing
the RSSI of the most recent packets received.
If the average difference δ¯ rises above a predetermined
threshold τ , then the Wand declares it is in close proximity to
the transmitting device. The Wand waits to check for proximity
until it has received at least ω packets, and re-checks for
proximity every ω/2 packets afterward using the last ω RSSI
values until it detects it is close to the device or times out.
In this way, the Wand can determine when it is in close
proximity to a transmitting device even if the device has only
a single antenna. If the device has multiple antennas, Wanda
assumes it will transmit packets using only one of its antennas
and will not change transmitting antennas while executing the
detect primitive.
To execute detect, the user expresses the intent to start the
process by taking an action such as pressing a button on the
target device. The target device then begins broadcasting an
AssocReq packet every 50 ms indicating that it is looking to
connect with another device. The Wand uses those broadcast
packets to determine whether it is in close proximity to the
device using Equation (9).
The Wand can provide its user visual or audio feedback to
encourage the user to move the Wand closer if needed. The
Wand can change a row of LED lights or increase (decrease)
the frequency of an audio tone if the spread between RSSI
readings on the two antennas is becoming larger (smaller) to
indicate if the Wand is getting closer to (farther from) the
target device. Additionally, a visual indicator such as a sticker
bearing a Wanda logo could be affixed on top of the antenna
location on the target device to make detect easier. The user
would then simply move the Wand close to the sticker and
initiate the detect process. See Figure 4 for an example of how
a logo could be affixed to a blood pressure monitor.
Once the Wand determines that it is in close proximity to
the device, it sends an AssocAck packet to the target device.
The target device receives the AssocAck, stops transmitting
packets, and begins listening for Message packets from the
Wand.
B. Impart primitive
After devices are in close proximity, the Wand can exploit a
property of radio wave propagation called reciprocity to impart
information onto another device. Reciprocity says that a signal
will experience the same multipath properties (e.g., attenuation
phase shifts, delays) in both directions of the link [7]. This
means that transmitting from the target device to the Wand
has the same fading characteristics as transmitting from the
Wand to the target device. As we saw above, the Wand should
see a large RSSI Ratio when a transmitting device is close
to the Wand. Similarly, due to reciprocity, the device should
see a large difference in RSSI when the Wand transmits from
antenna A1 vs. when it transmits from antenna A2.
Fig. 4. Blood pressure monitor with Wanda logo indicating where to place
the Wand.
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Fig. 5. Large difference in RSSI received from 1,000 Wi-Fi packets sent by
antenna A1 located 3 cm from the receiving antenna, compared with 1,000
Wi-Fi packets sent by antenna A2 located 10 cm from the receiving antenna.
Wanda exploits the expected difference in RSSI on the target
device to impart information. The Wand first converts the data
to impart onto the device into a binary string m and then sends
m one bit at a time. To send a 1, the Wand sends a Message
packet using the closest antenna, A1. To send a 0, it sends a
Message packet using the farthest antenna, A2. If the Wand
and device are physically close together, the device will see
a large difference in RSSI depending on which antenna the
Wand used. For example, if we assume as above that the Wand
is pointing directly at the device and the distance d1 between
A1 and the device is 3 cm, then with α = 2, the different in
signal strength received on the device between a packet sent by
antenna A1 vs. A2 would be about 10.5 dBm by Equation (6).
This yields a situation where the signal strength of packets
sent from antenna A1 will be significantly higher than the signal
strength of packets sent from antenna A2. Figure 5 shows an
example of the difference in RSSI at the receiving device of
1,000 Wi-Fi packets sent by transmitting antenna A1 located
3 cm from the receiver, intermixed with 1,000 packets sent by
transmitting antenna A2 located 10 cm from the receiver. It is
clear that there was a large difference in RSSI depending on
which antenna sent the packet. In this case, the RSSI values
are consistent with Equation (6) with the path loss exponent
α = 1.6.
To decode the message m sent by the Wand, the target
device simply calculates the average RSSI over all packets
received and then compares the RSSI value for each packet
with the average RSSI over all received packets. If the RSSI
for an individual packet is above the average, the target device
declares the packet to be a 1. If the RSSI is below the average,
the target device declares the packet to be a 0. More formally:
r¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=0
r(i) (10)
mˆ(i) =
{
1 if r(i) ≥ r¯
0 if r(i) < r¯
where r(i) is the RSSI measured on the single antenna of the
target device for packet i and mˆ(i) is the ith bit in the message
received. Once this process is complete the device will have a
string mˆ representing the string m sent by the Wand.
To ensure the target device is not missing any bits in message
m due to dropped packets, each Message packet sent by the
Wand carries an increasing sequence number in the payload.
The target device uses the sequence number of each packet to
determine whether it missed any packets. If any packets are
missing the device requests a resend of only those missing
packets; otherwise it sends an empty list to the Wand.
To be clear, the information is transferred using the RSSI
alone – the packets themselves sent do not contain portions of
the message m. The payload only contains a sequence number
so the target device can identify any missing bits.
The Wand sends the entire message without waiting for
acknowledgement from the target device. When all message
bits have been transmitted, the Wand sends a Done packet.
The Done packet is similar to a Message packet, but it also
includes a hash of m in the payload. Once the target device
receives the Done message, it computes the value for each bit,
creating message mˆ on the target.
Finally, the target device hashes mˆ and compares it with the
hash of m included in the Done packet. If the hashes match,
the device received all of the packets correctly. If the hashes
do not match, the target device tries flipping each bit in mˆ, one
at a time, re-hashes, and compares with the hash sent by the
Wand. If a match is still not found, the target device follows a
similar pattern but tries flipping two bits. If a match is still not
found, the target device signals the Wand to restart by sending
Bit String
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Fig. 6. Receiving a message m of “hello” at distances of d1 = 3 and 30 cm.
Packets representing bit values of 1 should be received on the target device
with an RSSI above the average and packets representing bit values of 0 should
be received below the average. Circles represent bits received correctly and
X’s represent errors. The message was received with no errors at 3 cm, but
had numerous errors at 30 cm.
a Restart packet. If a match is found, the device transmits a
Success packet to the Wand.
If the message to be imparted is long, it could be sent in
chunks to enable the target device to efficiently flip bits. On
the other hand, if messages are short they may be susceptible
to an adversary discovering the message by brute-force flipping
bits and hashing. To protect against these potential exploits
Wanda can chunk long messages and pad short messages into
128-bit messages.
To illustrate the impart primitive, we converted the message
“hello” into binary and sent it to a target device using the
impart primitive. Figure 6 shows the results. The message was
easily decoded at a distance d1 = 3 cm and had many errors
with d1 = 30 cm.
IV. PROTOCOLS
Wanda uses the primitive operations detect and impart
described above to build protocols for configuring new devices.
In this section we define three higher-level protocol operations:
(1) Common Key, where a target device is imparted with
parameters that are common to all devices in a local-area
network, and (2) Unique Key, where two devices connect with
a key unique to that pair of devices, and (3) Copy and Paste
where the Wand copies data from one device and pastes it onto
another without creating a lasting bond between devices.
A. Common Key protocol
The Common Key protocol is used when a new device must
be configured with information common to all devices in a
local-area network such as the blood-pressure monitor described
above. The blood-pressure monitor must learn the SSID and
password of a Wi-Fi AP. In this case we expect the Wand has
earlier learned the SSID and password from the Wi-Fi AP over
a wired USB connection. One can imagine the Wand being a
7 cm stick that lives in the USB port of the AP, keeping its
batteries charged so it is ready when needed, and using the
USB to securely obtain the connectivity parameters from the
AP.
The Wand and target device then implement the Common
Key protocol as follows: the Wand and target device run the
detect primitive to determine if they are close together. Once
the Wand determines it is in close proximity to the target device
it runs the impart primitive to send the SSID and password
to the target device. After the target device has confirmed it
has properly received the message, flipping bits if necessary as
described in the impart primitive, the target device connects
to the Wi-Fi AP using the SSID and password it received, and
the Wand is then not required for future communications.
B. Unique Key protocol
A slightly more complicated scenario arises when a user
wants two devices to establish a connection using a key that is
unique to those two devices. In this case the Wand can facilitate
the introduction of the devices. The Unique Key protocol starts
with the Wand generating a random key R. The Wand and
Device 1 run detect and impart to send R to Device 1. The
Device 1 includes its IP address (if it has one) in the payload of
the Success message at the end of impart and the Wand notes
the IP address as well as the MAC address of the target device
from the packet headers. The user then carries the Wand close
to Device 2 and the Wand then imparts R plus the MAC and
IP address of Device 1 to Device 2 using detect and impart.
Device 2 can now open direct communications with Device 1
by sending a hash of R to Device 1 at the MAC or IP address
obtained from the Wand. Device 1 receives the hash from
Device 2 and hashes its own copy of R. If the hashes match,
then Device 1 bootstraps a MAC or IP layer connection with
Device 2 using R as an initial key. If the hashes do not match,
Device 1 does not attempt the connection.
C. Copy and Paste protocol
A third Wanda protocol is Copy and Paste. In Copy and Paste
one device has information that the user would like imparted
onto another device, although there may be no need for the
devices to form a lasting pair as in the Common Key or Unique
Key protocols. An example of where Copy and Paste could be
useful is the blood-pressure monitor scenario described above.
As shown above, the patient can use the Common Key protocol
to link the blood-pressure monitor to a Wi-Fi AP, and while
that solves the problem of getting a long-range communication
connection for the short-range blood-pressure monitor, it does
not solve the problem of getting the data stored in the patient’s
EHR. For data storage to happen the blood-pressure monitor
must know where and how to send the data. The blood-pressure
monitor must know things such as a Restful API URL to send
the medical readings, as well as the patient’s credentials such
as ID and password so the data can be stored in the correct
patient record in the EHR.
Copy and Paste is designed to solve this problem. Continuing
with the medical example, the patient brings the Wand to the
doctor’s office and performs the Copy phase by using detect
and impart to send a random key R onto a device in the
doctor’s office. The doctor’s office device encrypts the patient’s
credentials using R as a key and sends the resulting cypher
text c to the Wand. The Wand stores the cypher text until
the patient returns home. The patient then performs the Paste
phase by using detect and impart to send random key R and
cypher text c to the blood-pressure monitor. The blood-pressure
monitor then decrypts the data and begins sending data to the
doctor while the Wand deletes the cypher text. In this way, the
Copy and Paste protocol copies the data from one device and
pastes it onto another device, even though the devices may be
physically far apart.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a Wand prototype using a Raspberry Pi 2
Model B computer [15] connected to two external Panda Ultra
Wireless N USB Wi-Fi adapters [16]. Figure 7 shows a photo of
the prototype Wand and medical device. A production version
would benefit by using one Wi-Fi card that has multiple
antennas (commonly found on 802.11n or 802.11ac Wi-Fi
devices). This single-radio, dual-antenna approach would ensure
consistent energy is transmitted by the two antennas and could
help reduce the potential for fingerprinting attacks [17], [18] by
generating the radio frequency energy from the same source.
We used an FDA approved A&D Medical UA-767PC blood-
pressure monitor [19] as the target device. Because we were
unable to modify the software on FDA approved medical
devices, we added an external Raspberry Pi with a single
Alfa Networks AWUS036H Wi-Fi antenna [11] and connected
to the blood-pressure monitor using a RS-232 over USB
connection. This gave us the ability to extract the blood-pressure
readings from the blood-pressure monitor using the RS-232
connection and the ability to communicate with the Wand
over the single Wi-Fi antenna. Of course the manufacturer of
the medical device would be able to alter their software to
include the Wanda protocols (Wanda does not require hardware
modification as long as the device has wireless connectivity),
but our prototype demonstrates that even an existing device
without a radio can be easily retrofitted to the conform to
Wanda. We imagine the retrofit device to be a small dongle
instead of our prototype Raspberry Pi-based system.
We then used the prototype Wand to impart two types
of information onto the retrofit blood-pressure monitor. First
we imparted the SSID and password of a local Wi-Fi AP
so the device could establish a connection and get to the
internet. Second, we imparted the URL and a username and
password for a Restful API representing a web service end
point into a medical Electronic Health Record (EHR) in the
cloud. The result is that now when someone measures their
Fig. 7. Prototype Wand and A&D Medical blood-pressure monitor as target
device (some cables removed for clarity).
systolic, diastolic, and pulse, the Raspberry Pi reads those
measurements and securely passes them to the simulated EHR.
We used Python and Scapy to create Wi-Fi data packets in
our prototype and packets were sent at Layer 2. While our
prototype used Wi-Fi, the technique could also be adapted for
other protocols such as Bluetooth or Zigbee.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluated both the detect and impart phases of Wanda.
For the evaluation we used the same software as our prototype,
but for easier control and monitoring of our experiments we
used a MacBook Pro instead of a Raspberry Pi.
A. Detect tests
We conducted 1,000 trials of the detect primitive where the
distance d1 between the Wand’s A1 antenna and the device’s
antenna ranged between 1 and 50 cm. Trials were conducted
at 1 cm intervals from 1 to 10 cm, then at 10 cm intervals
from 10 to 50 cm for a total of 14 distances with 1,000 trials
each. The percentage of trials where the Wand detected it was
in close proximity to the device is shown in Table II using
a window size ω = 20 and a threshold value τ = 6.2. We
chose this value for τ because the equations in Section III
estimate that detect will declare the devices in close proximity
when d1 is less than 6 cm. We found that at distances less
than 5 cm, proximity was detected 100% of the time. At 5 cm
proximity was detected 87% of the time, and at 6 cm proximity
was detected 38% of the time. At distances longer than 6 cm
proximity was not detected. These results suggest that detect
was able to correctly determine when it is in close proximity
to the device with high probability.
B. Impart tests
We tested Wanda’s ability to correctly impart data by first
confirming the RSSI differences behaved as expected, then
sent 1,000 messages from the Wand to the target device at
Distance Detected close
< 5 cm 100%
5 cm 87%
6 cm 38%
> 6 cm 0%
TABLE II
Percentage of time where the detect primitive detected close proximity. The
Wand implemented detect and successfully discerned proximity with high
accuracy at close range while correctly determining it was not in proximity at
longer ranges.
various distances and counted bit errors to determine the Wand’s
effective range. Finally we measured how fast the Wand could
impart information on target devices.
1) RSSI differences: To confirm that a single-antenna device
is able to correctly receive a message when using the impart
primitive, we tested whether it would consistently measure a
significant difference in RSSI based on the Wand’s transmitting
antenna (A1 or A2) as predicted by the equations in Section III.
In these tests the Wand sent 1,000 Wi-Fi data packets from
each of its two antennas, alternating between antenna A1 and
A2, where the distance d1 between antenna A1 and the device
ranged from 1 to 50 cm and the distance d2 was 7 cm larger
than d1. For this experiment, each Message packet contained a
sequence number as specified in the impart primitive, as well
as an indication of which antenna sent the packet to avoid
confusion over which antenna actually sent the packet.
The target device recorded the RSSI of each packet and
calculated an RSSI difference for each of the 1,000 pairs of
packets it received. The results are shown in Figure 8 along
with the RSSI difference predicted by Equation (6). The plot
shows that the values observed mirror the predicted values
when α = 1.6.
2) Bit errors: Next we measured how well the Wand was
able to impart information on another device. We ran 1,000
trials where the Wand sent a 128-bit random message to a
single-antenna target device, and then counted the number
of mismatched bits. Figure 9 shows that very few bit errors
occurred at close range, but the number of errors increased
significantly as distance between the Wand and the receiver, d1,
increased. Because each message contained 128 bits, random
guessing should yield 64 correct bits. In our experiments this
began to happen at a distance of about 30 cm.
To understand why impart yielded similar results to random
guessing at longer ranges, we examined the variation of
the difference in the RSSI Ratio at various distances. We
observed that as distance increased between the Wand and
the device, the standard deviation of the RSSI Ratio also
increased. This is because at close distances the direct line-
of-sight signal dominates the multipath signals. At longer
distances the distance traveled by the line-of-sight signal and
the multipath signal are not as divergent, resulting in much
larger variation in RSSI at longer distances [20]. Figure 10
shows the expected RSSI Ratio at various distances and the
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from antenna A1 vs. a packet sent from antenna A2 was less than the standard
deviation in the observed RSSI Ratio.
standard deviation of the RSSI Ratio of 1,000 packets sent
at each distance. We see that at 30 cm the variation in RSSI
Ratio becomes equal to the expected RSSI Ratio, and exceeds
the expected RSSI Ratio at longer distances. This suggests
that at distances of greater than about 30 cm, environmental
factors described in Section II make it extremely difficult for an
adversary to determine which antenna sent a particular packet.
Some of these errors can be corrected with the bit-flip
technique described above where the target device flips bits
in its derived message mˆ and re-hashes. Figure 11 shows the
percentage of successful message transfers at distance from 1
to 50 cm, correcting bits when needed, by flipping zero to three
bits. From this graph we see that messages were transferred
with a high probability of success when the Wand was less
than 6 cm from the device. Due to the variability in RSSI
Ratio, however, the bit-flipping technique is not effective at
long range. This suits a legitimate user well because the devices
are close together, but makes a distant attacker’s task difficult.
3) Timing: We also measured the speed at which the Wand
was able to impart a message. The average time to send 128
bits was 0.454 seconds which translates to just over 280 bits per
second. We note that our implementation was written in Python.
An implementation in C might have seen even faster throughput,
although for many applications transferring a message in under
half a second is acceptable. Additionally, long messages can
be sent by imparting a key and then using that key to encrypt
normal packets carrying data in their payload.
VII. SECURITY
In prior sections we show that Wanda works well; in this
section we evaluate its security against passive adversaries
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distances less than 6 cm messages were received with high probability.
attempting to eavesdrop on communications between the Wand
and the target device, and active adversaries attempting to
inject malicious information onto the target device or Wand.
We assume an adversary has complete knowledge of the Wanda
protocol and can use that knowledge to try to exploit the system.
We assume the adversary:
• is able to receive, tamper with, or inject packets into the
communications between the Wand and target device,
• is able to modulate its transmit power,
• may have multiple antennas and be positioned at multiple
locations,
• does not try to jam the communications channel, creating
a denial of service,
• does not have physical access to tamper with the Wand
or target device, and
• is located more than 30 cm away from the target device
and Wand while they are communicating.
A. Eavesdropping
Because the bits in the message m sent by the Wand are
encoded only in the Wand’s choice of transmitting antenna,
an adversary must determine which antenna sent a packet in
order to decode the information transferred. There are three
main ways this could be done by an adversary: (1) receive
packets from only one Wand antenna, (2) use the environment
to differentiate between antennas, and (3) analyze the RSSI to
differentiate between antennas.
Receive packets from only one Wand antenna:
If it were possible for an adversary to receive packets sent
by only one of the Wand’s antennas – not both – the adversary
would be able to determine which antenna sent all of the bits
in a message. The adversary would simply list the packet
sequence numbers it receives and infer those packets represent
a bit with a value of 1. For the sequence numbers the adversary
does not receive, it can assume those packets came from the
other antenna on the Wand and infer those represent a bit value
of 0. After all the packets are sent, if the adversary does not
drop any packets, the adversary will either be correct on all
bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 1s), or wrong
on all bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 0s) in
which case the adversary simply flips all bits.
The adversary’s dilemma is that both antennas on the Wand
are close together and radiate energy that travels outward in a
spherical shape. This makes receiving signals from only one
antenna very difficult. An adversary could try to use a highly
directional antenna and attempt to create a narrow main lobe
pointed precisely at one of the antennas on the Wand. Given
that the antennas on the Wand are only 7 cm apart, this is
unlikely to work if the attacker is located a reasonable distance
away because the main lobe expands with distance and should
encompass both of the Wand’s antennas.
Use the environment to differentiate between antennas:
An attacker might also attempt to determine which antenna
sent a packet by detecting differences in the signal due
to environmental effects. Because the characteristics of the
received signal depend on the specific paths taken as the signal
travels from the transmitter to the receiver, and signals from
different transmit antennas might take different paths to an
adversary, the adversary might be able to determine which
antenna sent each packet. The chances of this attack succeeding,
however, are vanishingly small. Cai et al. calculated the odds
of an attacker succeeding with this type of attack from a
random location to be 10−15 [6]. They go on to suggest that, in
theory, an attacker might choose an ideal location by carefully
measuring locations, geometries, and surface properties of all
objects in the environment. While this precise measurement is
practically impossible, nevertheless even that attack could be
mitigated by incorporating a frequency-hopping scheme where
each packet is sent on a different Wi-Fi frequency.
Analyze the RSSI to differentiate between antennas:
Wanda uses a simple algorithm on the target device to
determine which antenna sent a packet based on the RSSI, but
we assume an adversary can use more sophisticated techniques.
While we cannot anticipate every possible technique, we expect
from Equation (6) that the difference in RSSI when the Wand
uses antenna A1 vs. when it uses antenna A2 will be small
when the Wand is not close to the adversary. Additionally,
the environmental noise described in Section II increases as
distance increases. Figure 12 illustrates these differences for
1,000 packets sent by antenna A1 and 1,000 packets sent by
antenna A2 at d1 = 3 cm and d1 = 50 cm. As expected,
the RSSIs of packets from the same transmit antenna form a
Gaussian with a distinct mean (due to distance) and standard
deviation (due to noise).
If an adversary were somehow armed with knowledge of
the Gaussians of each antenna on the Wand, they might be
able to determine which antenna sent a packet. When a packet
arrives, the adversary could measure the RSSI and determine
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Fig. 12. RSSI distribution of 1,000 packets sent where d1 = 3 cm and 50 cm.
At close range there was a distinct difference between antennas whereas at
longer distances the gaussian distributions of packet RSSIs heavily overlapped.
from which distribution that sample is drawn, that is, which
antenna is most likely responsible for sending the packet.
The distributions are constantly changing due to changing
environmental factors, however, making this assumption of
a priori knowledge of the Gaussians unrealistic.
Even if an attacker somehow did have perfect knowledge
of the Gaussian distributions that characterize packets sent by
each antenna on the Wand, the adversary will still suffer from
a large number of errors when observing from long distances.
Figure 13 shows that, even if armed with perfect knowledge
of the packet distributions, an adversary only a short distance
away would still make nearly 50% bit errors predicting which
antenna sent a packet using the Gaussian distributions. We
conducted those experiments with a prototype built with two
radios (rather than one radio), cheap antennas (not specifically
selected for a spherical radio dispersion pattern), and without
precise antenna alignment (see Figure 7); a commercial Wand
(with a single radio and two antennas selected and aligned
carefully) would be even harder to attack in this manner.
B. Malicious packets
An active adversary may attempt to inject information onto
the target device by tricking the target device into believing it is
communicating with the Wand while the Wand is not actually
present. Wanda defends against the attack by asking the user to
declare the intention to start the protocol on the target device
by taking an action such as pushing a button on the target
device. This ensures that when the Wand is not present, the
target device will not begin running the Wanda protocols. In
that case, if an adversary were to try to communicate with the
target device, the target device would not respond.
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Alternatively, an adversary could try to override the infor-
mation sent by the Wand while the Wand is communicating
with the target device. To override the Wand, an adversary
might modulate its transmission power; increasing power to
send a 1 and decreasing power to send a 0. The target device,
which may have only a single antenna, has no way of knowing
if these modulated signals are coming from a nearby Wand
or from a distant adversary because the RSSI of the packets
would appear to the target device in the same way packets
appear from the Wand. To prevent this attack, the Wand can
monitor for rogue Message packets that it did not send. If it
detects rogue packets, the Wand can send a Stop packet to the
target device to halt the process.
The Wand can protect itself from storing malicious data
(as in the Copy and Paste protocol), by ensuring any received
packets have a large RSSI ratio. This test would ensure the data
came from a nearby target device, and not a distant attacker
attempting to exploit the Wand.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Researchers have proposed many solutions to the problem
of securely configuring new devices. While the proposed
approaches vary widely, they can be categorized into two
main groups: out-of-band (OOB) and in-band communications.
In OOB solutions a secret key is exchanged between devices
over a secondary communication channel that is impervious
to observation and interference by an adversary; the devices
then bootstrap a secure connection over the primary channel
using the information exchanged over the secondary channel.
In-band approaches differ in that they only use the primary
communication channel to establish a secure connection. In
this section we examine some of the proposed solutions and
highlight some of their differences with Wanda.
A. Out-Of-Band
Systems employing an OOB approach use a secondary
channel to exchange secret information (e.g., a cryptographic
key) that is used to secure the primary channel’s communication.
While many methods have been proposed, they often use the
wired [21], visual [22]–[27], audio [28], [29], gesture [30], [31]
or secondary radios such as RFID or NFC [32] channels to
convey secret information. These approaches, however, assume
the presence of hardware that may not be present on some
devices and may also require complex processing that exceeds
the capabilities of embedded devices.
Wanda differs significantly from these all of these approaches
in that it does not assume the presence of specialized hardware
other than the existing wireless radio, nor does it require
advanced processing power. Furthermore, Wanda requires little
human effort and the Wand’s mobility allows it to be used
when devices that are not physically adjacent or would be
inconvenient to move (such as a treadmill and a Wi-Fi AP).
B. In-Band
Researchers have also suggested techniques that do not
require an OOB channel, but instead exploit characteristics of
the in-band radio channel. These techniques are typically more
closely aligned with Wanda than OOB techniques.
Although Gollakota et al. developed an in-band method to
defend against Man-In-The-Middle attacks [33], their approach
alters the Wi-Fi protocol. Most in-band approaches, however,
use characteristics of the radio channel to develop a secret
key independently on two devices. To develop the secret key,
each device typically goes through several phases. The first
phase is bit extraction where each device monitors a common
radio channel simultaneously and extracts bits from extreme
signal fluctuations to form a string of bits. The next phase,
reconciliation, ensures both devices have extracted the same
bit string. Reconciliation normally involves several rounds
exchanging information about portions of the bit string, such
as checksums, in the clear. Finally, a privacy amplification phase
reduces the size of the bit string to form a secret key that is
known to the participating devices and unknown with high
probability by an adversary [34]. Several works use a variant of
this extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach [35]–[37].
The extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach has
several shortcomings. First, it is quite slow, often taking 30
seconds or more to make connections. Wanda is fast, taking
less than half a second on average to send a 128-bit message.
Another problem is that Wi-Fi, in many practical environments,
lacks the necessary entropy to extract a secure bit string [10].
Wanda does not rely on random environmental fluctuations to
generate common bits on two devices; it imparts the bits onto
a target device based on the antenna chosen by the Wand.
Wanda does share common elements with two papers. In
Good Neighbor [6] the authors use the equations in Section III
of this paper to determine whether a sending device with a
single antenna is in close proximity to a receiving device with
two antennas. Good Neighbor, however, runs 8 times slower on
average than Wanda and only protects the two-antenna receiver –
it does not protect the single-antenna sender. For example, using
the Good Neighbor final protocol, if an adversary sends its
public key to the sender before the receiver does (as in a Man-
In-The-Middle attack), the adversary can pair with the device
for 11.64 seconds on average before the receiver determines its
pairing failed and alerts the user. During that time the sending
device has no idea it is connected to an attacker. Furthermore,
when the user discovers the intended receiver is not connected,
the user will likely suspect the pairing simply failed and may
re-start the connection process, leaving the attacker with an
ongoing valid connection. As noted in Section VII, however,
Wanda protects both devices while they communicate. Also,
with Good Neighbor at least one of the devices must be mobile
so two devices can be placed in close proximity. If both devices
are difficult or impossible to move, then Good Neighbor will
not work. With Wanda, however, the Wand easily can move
close to multiple non-mobile devices.
Another recent approach called SeAK [38] uses two antennas
to develop a secret key, but in that paper each device
independently develops a key based on the RSSI of exchanged
packets. In Wanda, the Wand knows the secret information and
imparts it onto the other device without the need for the Wand
to develop the same key as the target device.
IX. FUTURE WORK
Wanda’s ability to impart data onto a device could be useful
in a variety of areas, but in future work we intend to build
on Wanda to create a larger mobile healthcare solution. That
expanded solution will give multiple doctors the ability to
request mobile health data from patients, allow patients to
approve or deny requests, and allow patients to easily manage
those permissions. For example, a patient’s general practice
physician might request blood pressure data as illustrated in
Section I, but so might the patient’s cardiologist (who may
belong to a different organization that uses a different EHR
system). This suggests the blood pressure data might need to
get to multiple EHR systems, assuming the patient approves
the doctor’s requests. Wanda currently does not address this
issue.
Another future direction is to create the Wanda system
with protocols other than Wi-Fi. Many medical devices use
Bluetooth or Zigbee. An extended Wanda could be useful for
communicating with those devices.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce a system called Wanda. Wanda
is able to simply, securely, and consistent with user intent,
impart data onto devices. Among other uses, this data can
be used for three fundamental operations when bringing a
device into a new setting: (1) configure new devices to join a
wireless local-area network (using Common Key), (2) partner
devices with other nearby devices so they can work together
(using Unique Key), and (3) configure devices so they can
connect to accounts in the cloud (using Copy and Paste). Wanda
does this by implementing two primitive operations, detect
and impart, which allow a new piece of hardware called the
Wand to detect when it is physically near another device,
then impart information onto that nearby device using a novel
radio signal strength method of communication. Experiments
with our prototype implementation show that Wanda is fast
and effective, and our security analysis demonstrates that it
should be resistant to passive and active adversaries. Indeed, we
expect Wanda is faster, easier, more flexible, and more secure
than existing alternatives for device pairing and for intentional
interaction with wireless devices.
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